Zimbabwe: A Opiniao de David Coltart

Op-ed in The Australian
Wednesday December 24, 2008
By Senator David Coltart


ZIMBABWE is in the vortex of a perfect humanitarian storm; an unprecedented convergence of AIDS, poverty, hyperinflation, malnutrition, a regime that does not care and, now, cholera. The humanitarian crisis has its roots in the political crisis.

The political agreement signed in September by ZANU-PF and both factions of the Movement for Democratic Change has not been implemented. Both the agreement and the process leading to the agreement have been widely criticised.

There is no doubt that the agreement is seriously flawed. The powers of the Prime Minister are weak and the prospects of securing consensus in a cabinet in which the combined MDC factions have a narrow majority are limited. Scepticism in the West may also result in limited support for the transitional government.

ZANU-PF has demonstrated extreme bad faith since the signing of the agreement and is unlikely to change even once the transitional government has been established. There has been a surge in abductions of human rights and political activists in recent weeks and Morgan Tsvangirai still has not been given a passport. ZANU-PF also retains all the coercive ministries, including defence, the secret police and the police.

However, as bad as the agreement is, there is no other viable, nonviolent option open to Zimbabweans. An appeal to the African Union or the UN against what the Southern African Development Community has arranged and endorsed, namely the September agreement, will be fruitless.That was demonstrated graphically this week through the frustration of the US and Britain's attempts to raise Zimbabwe's humanitarian crisis in the Security Council. While strong statements made by Gordon Brown, George W. Bush, Angela Merkel and Desmond Tutu have called for the removal of Robert Mugabe, there is little prospect that their rhetoric will translate into action. There is no stomach in the West for military intervention and many of us opposed to Mugabe would not support such a policy.

A spontaneous uprising is unlikely. Zimbabwe does not have a pressure-cooker environment such as existed in East Germany where young people, usually the vanguard of any uprising, are forced to remain in the country. Zimbabwe has two safety valves - Botswana and South Africa - to which most of the young opponents have escaped. Most people left in the country are physically weakened by the collapse of the economy and the humanitarian crisis.

Some argue that if the MDC waits a while the Mugabe regime will collapse. This is a possibility but a huge gamble. There is every chance that in the event of Mugabe losing power some of the more radical elements within the military may seize power, which in turn could see Zimbabwe degenerate into even worse forms of anarchy than exist at present.

Furthermore, a wait-and-see policy will not address the extreme humanitarian crisis that needs to be resolved immediately if the lives of potentially hundreds of thousands are to be saved.

In short, there is no alternative but to press for the September agreement to be implemented, warts and all. The combined MDC should join the transitional government under protest and reserve its right to withdraw from the government if needs be.

It should also be stressed that the agreement is not all bad.

Indeed, Zimbabweans suffer from such a victim mentality that there is a danger that in focusing so much on the negative aspects of the agreement we will ignore the real opportunities that the agreement provides to transform Zimbabwe from an autocracy to a democracy.

First, the office of prime minister will have huge de facto power. The success of the transitional government will depend on the amount of international assistance that can be raised. There is such disdain for Mugabe that there is no prospect of any assistance coming through his door. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Union and other governments and institutions will want to channel all their aid through the office of prime minister. MDC also will hold the finance ministry, giving Tsvangirai enormous power and an effective veto. If he decides to withdraw from the transitional government, aid will dry up at the same time.

Second, ZANU-PF's fixation with controlling the coercive ministries has resulted in it ceding control to the combined MDC of nearly all the service ministries, such as health and education, likely to have the biggest impact on the lives of Zimbabweans. If the MDC improves services, which should not be too difficult given that most government departments have all but collapsed, it will increase its support.

Third, the agreement obliges the transitional government to liberalise the political environment and to start, immediately, a process of constitutional reform that must culminate in a new democratic constitution being enacted within 18 months. Both SADC and the AU have guaranteed the agreement including these provisions.
In addition, for all the criticisms levelled against SADC governments in the past few months, they have demonstrated a commitment to enforce all the terms of the agreement and it will be in regional governments' self-interest to ensure reform continues.

Fourth, ZANU-PF is a shadow of its former self. Mugabe turns 85 in February and is increasingly out of touch with reality. He has retained some of his patronage system, ironically, because the transitional government has not been set up, but once it is he will be even weaker.

So, although the agreement is fraught with potential problems, the sooner it is implemented the better. Constitutional amendment 19, which gives legal teeth to the September agreement, has just been gazetted. By mid-January 2009 it should be passed into law, making the process of transition almost irreversible.

Thereafter the success of the transitional period will depend on the statesmanship of Zimbabwean politicians and the role played by the international community. SADC must honour its pledge to guarantee the agreement. It must deploy a senior envoy to enforce the agreement and to be permanently based in Harare at least for the 18 months leading to the enactment of a new constitution.

The wider international community including the IMF, World Bank, UN, EU and the US, is going to have to give the agreement a chance by helping to stabilise Zimbabwe's economy and address the humanitarian crisis. While there is understandable scepticism about the agreement, it is important that these concerns do not become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

One thing is certain. If the MDC is unable to improve the lives of Zimbabweans, the agreement will fail and the region will be further destabilised.