Second person convicted of contravening South Africa's non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act

Second Person Convicted of Contravening South Africa’s Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act

On 5 February 2008 South African-based Swiss engineer Daniel Geiges became the second person to be found guilty in South Africa of being linked to the international nuclear smuggling ring of A.Q. Khan.
Geiges was given a 13-year suspended sentence after he agreed, as part of a plea bargain, to assist the authorities in their investigations and to testify in other proceedings if more arose in the future. Geiges admitted to contravening South Africa’s Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 1993 (Act No. 87 of 1993) and the Nuclear Energy Act, 1999 (Act No. 46 of 1999), which he violated by being involved in the clandestine illegal import, export and manufacture of components relating to nuclear-related equipment and material.

In 2007, South African-based German engineer Gerhard Wisser was given an 18-year suspended sentenced for his role in the network.

In a statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board in September 2007, South Africa’s Deputy Director-General: Ambassador and Special Representative on Disarmament, Abdul Minty, who is also the Chairperson of the Non-Proliferation Council, revealed that investigations into the activities of the two South African-based men had started soon after Libya's announcement of the abandonment of its nuclear weapons programme.

The South African authorities instituted an intensive investigation into the possible involvement of two South African registered corporate entities, Krisch Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd and Tradefin Engineering CC, in the A.Q. Khan Network. The investigation specifically focused on the import and export of a controlled flow-forming machine, as well as the production and attempted export of certain components associated with a centrifuge enrichment plant. Both formed part of Libya’s undeclared nuclear activities. The investigation also found that between 1986 and 1995 these companies supplied controlled nuclear equipment to Pakistan.

These two court cases reflect South Africa’s commitment to the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) and augers well as South Africa prepares for the April session of the Preparatory Committee for the next review conference in 2010 of the NPT. Most commentators seem to agree that the nuclear non-proliferation regime is in deep trouble. While South Africa has done its bit to curtail the AQ Khan Network, which potentially presented a serious challenge to the NPT, it should also be ready to face the NPT’s other unprecedented challenges which mainly centre around those states still with nuclear weapons not complying with their disarmament commitments.

Noel Stott, Senior Researcher: Arms Management Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)